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DIRECTIONS '77 PROGRAM

AMERICAN FORCES RADIO AND TELEVISION SERVICE

Guest: Admiral Stansfield Turner,  
Director of CIA

Corr: John Uschold

LIVE TAPE TRANSCRIPTION

9 JUNE 1977  
(Taping Session)

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. USCHOLD: Our guest on Directions is Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence.

We'll be discussing the key issues involving the intelligence community and the Department of Defense.

Admiral Turner, many people when they think of the Central Intelligence Agency conjure up the idea of a mystical Mission Impossible organization: the cloak and dagger, trench coat, the Agent 007 kind of thing. How would you characterize Central Intelligence?

ADMIRAL TURNER: The secret agent part of our business out here at the Central Intelligence Agency is a very important but a relatively small part of our activities.

The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 to have one central focal point for intelligence in this country that was not related to policy making as are the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

So one of the most important functions we play here is to collate and bring together all of the intelligence that is derived in all of the agencies of the Government that play a part in intelligence.

1                   That's a massive analytic function. It's  
2                   like a major research organization in a university.  
3                   That's perhaps the biggest activity here. The covert,  
4                   secretive collection of intelligence is another and  
5                   important part. It's one of the contributors to that.

6                   But the major thing we do here is really  
7                   research.

8                   MR. USCHOLD: There has been some criticism  
9                   of the covert operations, the dirty tricks aspect. Is  
10                  there a need for this?

11                  ADMIRAL TURNER: There is primarily a need to  
12                  have a standby capability to do covert action. Covert  
13                  action is trying to influence events in other countries  
14                  as opposed to collecting intelligence.

15                  They are really separate functions. It happens  
16                  that the Congress resided the covert action function in  
17                  the Central Intelligence Agency. It could have been  
18                  put other places.

19                  There are situations such as the possibility  
20                  that a terrorist group might gain access to a nuclear  
21                  weapon, and this country would be very unhappy I think if  
22                  we did not have a standby covert action capability to  
23                  influence that kind of a situation.

24                  MR. USCHOLD: How great is that potential

1 a nuclear weapon?

2 ADMIRAL TURNER: It's always a considerable  
3 danger by means of theft. It's a considerable danger  
4 should we have more nuclear proliferation into more and  
5 more countries of the world whose security procedures  
6 with their weapons might not be as good as ours.

7 We are quite confident that ours are secure.

8 MR. USCHOLD: Your position now as Director  
9 of Central Intelligence takes in more than just the  
10 CIA itself. I wonder if you would explain that.

11 ADMIRAL TURNER: The law of 1947 provides  
12 that I have two jobs: Director of Central Intelligence  
13 and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

14 The latter, the Agency, is just one element  
15 of the intelligence community, we call it. As Director  
16 of Central Intelligence, I'm responsible for coordinating  
17 all of the intelligence activities in the United States  
18 Government, including those in the Department of  
19 Defense, the Department of State, the Treasury Depart-  
20 ment, the F.B.I. and so on; that is, the intelligence  
21 part of the F.B.I., not the law enforcement part of it.

22 If they acquire intelligence in the process  
23 of law enforcement, they turn it over to us, and we do  
24 that.

In this degree, I have some authority over all

1 the elements of intelligence in the Department of  
2 Defense.

3 There is a fine line here of shared control  
4 with the Secretary of Defense because they are his  
5 elements, he gets the budget for them, and basically  
6 operates them; I give the overall direction as to what  
7 is desired.

8 As Director of Central Intelligence Agency,  
9 I am actually the operating head of one of the many  
10 components of the intelligence community.

11 MR. USCHOLD: Now within the Department of  
12 Defense there is the Defense Intelligence Agency. Is  
13 there a duplication of effort?

14 ADMIRAL TURNER: There is a degree of dupli-  
15 cation of effort between the research function and the  
16 Department of Defense's Intelligence Agency, the CIA's  
17 Research Intelligence Agency, and the State Department's  
18 research function, and that's a very desirable thing  
19 because when you interpret the facts of intelligence  
20 there is never a right or a wrong answer; it's a matter  
21 of interpretation, understanding, and you want different  
22 viewpoints, and there is why we like to have a sort of  
23 competing analysis situation between Defense, State, and  
24 the CIA and, in some cases, Treasury and other elements

in particular specialties.

1 MR. USCHOLD: It seems somewhat incongruous  
2 that here we have an admiral who is the Director of  
3 Central Intelligence reporting to the President, but  
4 yet over on the other side you have the Department of  
5 Defense and an intelligence community there.

6 I should think that the admiral in this case  
7 the chain of command would be through the Joint Chiefs  
8 and the Secretary, of course, and then to the President.  
9 I wonder if you would explain that relationship.

10 ADMIRAL TURNER: Again, back to the law of  
11 1947 which established this operation, it specifically  
12 provides that the Director of Central Intelligence may  
13 be an active duty or a retired military officer or a  
14 civilian.

15 It also provides that if it is an active duty  
16 military officer he will carry out no responsibilities  
17 to the Department of Defense or report to anybody in  
18 the Department of Defense.

19 So I am prohibited from being in any way  
20 subordinate to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
21 or even the Secretary of Defense with regard to my  
22 business.

23 I do hold my military rank and privileges and  
24 my military pay.

25 MR. USCHOLD: That's another question that I  
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1 know has been presented to you a number of times as some  
2 charge that you're really using this position as a  
3 stepping stone, that you are, should I say, a transient  
4 custodian of CIA, and that ultimately you would like to  
5 be Chief of Naval Operations or even Chairman of the  
6 Joint Chiefs.

7 I wonder if you would tell us what your  
8 personal goals, your personal career goals, are in this  
9 case.

10 ADMIRAL TURNER: I've had the same career  
11 goal for 31 years, John, and that's to serve this  
12 country in the best way I can.

13 On the 3rd of February the President asked  
14 me to come back here, and I didn't know why. When he  
15 told me he thought I could best serve the country as  
16 the Director of Central Intelligence, I gave him the  
17 standard answer: aye, aye, sir; if that's what you want  
18 me to do, I'll do it.

19 In the future I'll do the same thing: If he  
20 wants me to leave and retire and become a civilian, I'll  
21 do that.

22 If he wants me to go to a military spot of  
23 any sort, I'll do that. I would suspect that there's  
24 a real need for the incumbent in my place to stay here  
25 a while.

1           We've had too many Directors of the CIA and  
2           Central Intelligence in the last few years. For  
3           unfortunate reasons, people have only stayed short  
4           terms, and that's not good for as important an organi-  
5           zation as this.

6           Finally, let me just say that I'm offended  
7           when people accuse me of stepping stoning. I did not  
8           ask for this job. I am very pleased to have it.

9           It's an honor to have it, and there's a  
10          tremendously important task to be done for our country  
11          here, and I'm pleased to have been given that responsi-  
12          bility.

13          But I'm not sitting here looking for what I  
14          can get tomorrow; I am interested in serving our  
15          country as well as I can today.

16          MR. USCHOLD: Being here only a short time,  
17          nevertheless, some say that your running of the CIA,  
18          that you run a tight ship and that has caused some  
19          morale problems.

20          How do you look at this?

21          ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we have a saying in  
22          the Navy that a taut ship is a happy ship. Yes, I  
23          always like to run a taut ship.

24          I don't believe there is a morale problem  
25          out here. I think there is some concern at this time



1 because there's lots of discussion in the newspapers  
2 of a major reorganization of the intelligence community.

3 And if you can put yourself in the shoes of  
4 these dedicated people here in the Intelligence Agency,  
5 you realize that they have been under attack in the  
6 press, under investigation by the Congress for 2-1/2  
7 years.

8 Now somebody is talking about reorganizing,  
9 and naturally they are concerned. They want to know  
10 what's going to happen.

11 That's the principal morale problem here,  
12 and we're doing everything we can to resolve that as  
13 quickly as we can because they deserve to know what the  
14 future is going to be.

15 But I can only say that although the details  
16 are still being ironed out in the executive branch  
17 and with the Congress, there is no question that we  
18 must have a strong intelligence community and that the  
19 CIA is going to be an important part of it.

20 MR. USCHOLD: Before coming to this position,  
21 you were over in Europe and in a position as Commander  
22 and Chief of Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

23 Based upon your experience there and your  
24 present position, how do you perceive the strength of

25 NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact countries?

1 ADMIRAL TURNER: I still think NATO has an  
2 edge on the Warsaw Pact countries in all important  
3 categories of warfare.

4 At the same time, the growing strength of  
5 the Warsaw Pact, particularly on ground forces in  
6 Central Europe, is an alarming trend, and we must con-  
7 tinue to match that growing strength or we will be in  
8 a position of inferiority.

9 I think, however, John, that you must look  
10 to the fact that NATO is a free alliance of 15 nations  
11 who voluntarily get together, and they sometimes squabble  
12 with each other, and it comes out in the public like the  
13 very debilitating dispute between the Greeks and the  
14 Turks during the last several years, which hurts the  
15 Alliance.

16 But in the long run, there is strength in the  
17 freedom to have different opinions and to dispute because  
18 you don't have that in the Warsaw Pact.

19 There is one boss, one dominating country,  
20 and I'm not sure the Soviets can fully count on the  
21 alliance that they've got; I'm sure that we can if the  
22 chips are down in ours.

23 MR. USCHOLD: What about President Carter's  
24 plan to withdraw ground troops from South Korea and

25 General (Singloves) concern over this; does that have

1 any validity as far as you are concerned?

2 ADMIRAL TURNER: I think that you have to  
3 appreciate that we've had 24 years of peace in Korea,  
4 and that means to me there's been a relative stability,  
5 a relative military balance.

6 The other side, which I think is an aggressive  
7 undemocratic nation, has not found it propitious to  
8 take any military action, so in some sense there's  
9 been a stand-off.

10 When the United States pulls its some  
11 33,000 ground forces out of Korea, the situation  
12 clearly will change.

13 But the issue, John, will be what can be  
14 done between now and the withdrawal of those forces  
15 to replace their fighting capability: not necessarily  
16 man for man and tube for tube and tank for tank, but  
17 their overall capability.

18 And I think that it's quite possible that that  
19 capability can be absorbed by the South Korean armed  
20 forces.

21 We'll have to watch and see. And it's my  
22 job to continually assess that balance. There is a  
23 balance today, and as it goes along with the withdrawal  
24 and replacement, I'll be trying to advise the President

25 on whether we think that balance is maintained.

1 MR. USCHOLD: Now in assessing the situation,  
2 whether it be in Korea or wherever in the world, how  
3 do you go about this? What factors bear on this  
4 assessment, and how do you obtain this kind of infor-  
5 mation?

6 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, that's a pretty big  
7 question, but we have to try to meld together all of the  
8 intelligence inputs that we get.

9 We get that from unclassified sources, reading  
10 newspapers, magazines, talking with people who travel.  
11 We get it from various technical means of collection.  
12 We get it from the clandestine collection of the CIA  
13 with what could be described as spies.

14 We have to bring all this information  
15 together and piece the clues together. It's sometimes  
16 fascinating because a clue over here that appears to  
17 have no relationship to another one over here, a smart  
18 analyst, a smart researcher, will bring together and  
19 draw a conclusion from.

20 So we do this. We have to try to get the  
21 best estimate we can on what in this case the military  
22 forces of North Korea have, how well-trained they are:  
23 watching their training exercises in all the different  
24 ways that we can.

25 Then we have to also look even broader than

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1       that and say what's the North Korean economy, what  
2       will they be able to afford in the way of armed forces  
3       improvement over the next five years, and weigh all that  
4       into a balance and then turn to a military analysis which  
5       says: all right, if they've got this many forces and  
6       we've got this many, but we're in a defensive posture,  
7       they're in an offensive posture, which is the assumption  
8       here, can we handle it. It's only 20-some miles from  
9       Seoul to the border. That's a particular military  
10      problem that has to be judged very carefully. It's not  
11      easy, and the answers are never concrete and exact.

12               MR. USCHOLD: In this work of gathering this  
13      information, do you work with, or do your people work  
14      with our military people around the world in various  
15      bases?

16               ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, absolutely. A major  
17      input to an assessment of balance in Korea will come  
18      from the DIA itself.

19               And just a few weeks ago I spoke with the  
20      Chief of Staff of the United Nations Command in Korea.  
21      He came out here, and we had a long talk about the  
22      military balance on that front.

23               So we're interested in the views of the  
24      commanders on the scene, their intelligence officers.

25               We're interested in the opinions of the Department of

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1 Defense, and we bring it all together.

2 MR. USCHOLD: A while back you mentioned the  
3 fact that you wear more than one hat. This must keep  
4 your work day well-occupied. What is your typical day  
5 like?

6 ADMIRAL TURNER: I usually get to the office  
7 at 8:00; we usually have a staff conference out here at  
8 9:00 and spend 30 or 40 minutes around the table seeing  
9 what are the key items of the day; about every other day  
10 I'm up on the Hill before Congress in some form or  
11 another. I was there for 3-1/2 hours yesterday morning  
12 in one form of testimony or another.

13 Twice a week I have an appointment with the  
14 President to give him an intelligence update, and that  
15 takes a lot of preparation, of course, so that will mean  
16 the day before that I will try to spend two to three  
17 hours in the office working on that and calling in  
18 analysts who will tell me things that are important to  
19 bring to the President's attention.

20 There are frequent meetings of the National  
21 Security Council and its sub-organizations. We had  
22 one before the decision was made on Korea, for instance,  
23 that you just asked me about, and we all put our opinions  
24 on the table so they could be sent to the President.

25 So there's these various meetings. Then,  
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1 obviously, as anyone in charge of a large organization,  
2 you've got a myriad of details and lots of people you  
3 have to see in your own organization to keep the thing  
4 running day by day.

5 MR. USCHOLD: This position now, has this  
6 changed your personal life style at all? Do you find  
7 yourself looking over your shoulder a little bit more?

8 ADMIRAL TURNER: Oh, I'd like to be back in  
9 Napoli. That was nice. No, I enjoy this very much,  
10 but it is quite a different life style than any military  
11 job that I had, simply because I'm dealing in a different  
12 arena: this is the national scene, not the military  
13 scene.

14 It's no more important, but it's different,  
15 and it's very interesting, but it's very demanding of  
16 my time.

17 MR. USCHOLD: What do you do to unwind with  
18 all the pressure?

19 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I have a good friend  
20 who's a vice admiral and he lives not far down the street,  
21 and we get out 6:30 in the morning twice a week and  
22 then usually again on Saturday and hit the tennis ball  
23 around, and if I can beat him in the morning, it really  
24 makes my day. I'm ready to go.

25 MR. USCHOLD: And if you lose?  
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1 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, then the poor staff  
2 is in bad shape that day when I come in all grumpy.

3 MR. USCHOLD: What about Mrs. Turner, how  
4 is she taking on this new role here?

5 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, she's a good sport.  
6 She sees a lot of me, but I'm always sitting there at  
7 home at night reading and working.

8 But there are, of course, some interesting  
9 social activities that we get involved in, and she  
10 enjoys those.

11 MR. USCHOLD: A while back when President  
12 Carter announced his energy plan, the CIA released a  
13 report on the worldwide energy situation. Of course  
14 you got some criticism for that.

15 I wonder if you would (1) address that  
16 aspect: the criticism, why did this come about and (2)  
17 what is your assessment of the worldwide energy  
18 situation.

19 ADMIRAL TURNER: On the first point we were  
20 criticized because they thought the CIA was being used  
21 for a political purpose.

22 I can only assure you that absolutely is not  
23 the truth. The study had been in process for over a  
24 year. I did not know it was under way; I'd only been  
25 here a couple of weeks when it was delivered to my

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1 desk. Now what would you do, John: you have a report  
2 of great significance to a decision the President is  
3 in the process of making?

4 Clearly, I had to provide it to him because  
5 it was important to him. We talked about it, and once  
6 he had made his decision and announced his energy pro-  
7 gram, it seemed that it was such an important factor  
8 that it was worth the public of the United States  
9 knowing.

10 MR. USCHOLD: I understand now you even said  
11 that you were going to make more material of this  
12 nature--not necessarily on energy--but more of this  
13 available to the public.

14 ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes.

15 MR. USCHOLD: Why is that?

16 ADMIRAL TURNER: I said that before that  
17 report was issued. In fact, one of the first policies  
18 I instituted out here was a program of declassifying  
19 information when it could be declassified.

20 And we had before that report came up several  
21 projects already under way and which are still under  
22 way.

23 My feeling is that the public pays a lot of  
24 money for this institution, and they're deserving of  
25 its product when it can be shared with them and that

1       this country will be stronger if it has a well-informed  
2       public, and to the extent that we can contribute to  
3       that without endangering the security of our infor-  
4       mation, we're going to be better.

5               MR. USCHOLD: Before we get into the energy  
6       question, what are some of the other subject areas that  
7       you will be releasing material on?

8               ADMIRAL TURNER: Let me say to begin with that  
9       this is not an entirely new policy out here. The CIA  
10      for years has published a lot of unclassified informa-  
11      tion, which is available through the Library of Congress  
12      to anybody who wants it.

13              We have many atlases of specific areas of the  
14      world where there are problems.

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And we intend just to push that a little bit  
more. I'd like to put out things about the world  
economy, what are the prospects for different minerals,  
what is the overall prospect for the economies of  
major areas of the world: China, the Soviet Union,  
Eastern Europe, even Western Europe to help people  
understand the policies which are operating.

1 MR. USCHOLD: Again on the question of  
2 energy. Where does the United States stand as related  
3 to the entire world situation now with energy?

4 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we stand in a position  
5 where we will have a growing requirement for the impor-  
6 tation of oil as one of our energy sources, but the  
7 problem that we have highlighted in our report from the  
8 CIA is a global problem, and it simply is this: that we  
9 believe in the next seven or eight years the world  
10 demand for energy will exceed the world's capacity to  
11 get oil out of the ground.

12 We are not talking about whether there's  
13 enough oil down in mother earth to meet our needs; we  
14 are only talking about in the short-term: seven or eight  
15 years, can the world as a whole get as much out of the  
16 ground as it would like to have.

17 MR. USCHOLD: You're saying 1985?

18 ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, we say before 1985:  
19 1982 and 1983, somewhere in there there will be a cross-  
20 over point where we will want more energy than can  
21 physically be brought to the surface, and that means  
22 either you've got to cut down or you've got to pay a  
23 higher price --

24 MR. USCHOLD: That's in oil that you're talking  
25 about.

1 ADMIRAL TURNER: In oil. Now we have taken  
2 into account here how much nuclear power, how much coal,  
3 how much gas is likely to be available in that mid-term.

4 Other solutions like lots more nuclear power  
5 may solve that problem over the longer run, but it takes  
6 about ten years to get a nuclear power plant going in  
7 this country.

8 So if it isn't on the drawing board today, we  
9 didn't take credit for it. But we made all those  
10 estimates, and we just think there will be a pressure  
11 on the price of oil because of a greater demand than  
12 availability of supply sometime in the next seven or  
13 eight years.

14 We really don't think that will come to pass  
15 because we think people will take action, but that's  
16 what we are trying to point out needs to be done.

17 MR. USCHOLD: Do you see a problem now with  
18 the Soviet Union as opposed -- as a result of this  
19 shortage?

20 ADMIRAL TURNER: The major factor driving our  
21 conclusion in this study was an estimate that the Soviet  
22 Union will become a net importer of oil rather than a  
23 net exporter, that they have trouble in their oil indus-  
24 try, and that it's just over the horizon, and that their  
25 production, which is still going up, will drop in the early  
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1 1980's peak and drop off sharply.

2 Now that's a conclusion open to dispute.

3 Though we find that most of the oil experts outside the  
4 Government tend to agree with us that there will be a  
5 drop-off in Soviet production, people have different  
6 estimates of how rapidly.

7 And if that's the case and the Soviets don't  
8 export oil but, in fact, are looking for oil, whether  
9 they actually buy it or not there will be pressure on  
10 the oil market as a result of this.

11 MR. USCHOLD: Admiral Turner, we have time  
12 for one more question. Looking down the road, looking  
13 into that crystal ball now, what personal goals and  
14 objectives do you have as Director of Central Intelli-  
15 gence?

16 ADMIRAL TURNER: The primary goal is to  
17 produce for the President, for the Congress, for the  
18 Defense Department and the other decision makers in our  
19 government as objective intelligence as we can. That's  
20 our job: to stand clear of policymaking, stand up and  
21 tell people what we think the true situation, the facts  
22 are, regardless of whether it supports what they like  
23 to hear or not.

24 Secondly, I'd like to be sure that the  
25 intelligence community as a whole is adapting to the

1 future: the rapid changes of technology, the rapid change  
2 in the political scene around the world.

3 Think how different it is today than it was  
4 30 years ago. And I believe because of that difference  
5 intelligence is more important than it ever was before.

6 Thirty years ago we were so far superior to  
7 anyone else in military power that intelligence while  
8 important was not critical.

9 But today when the balance of military power  
10 is much closer, if you do not have good intelligence to  
11 take advantage of what military strength you have,  
12 you may not make it.

13 And all of us in military uniforms should  
14 appreciate that because it may be the difference between  
15 victory and defeat.

16 Beyond that, John, I'd like to read you a  
17 quotation from an invocation that a Navy chaplain,  
18 Captain Jude (Senior) gave at my change of command when  
19 I left my NATO assignment in Naples a few months ago  
20 because I think it also epitomizes what I'd like to do  
21 and set as my goal here.

22 I had this framed because I liked it. He  
23 said: As the Director of Central Intelligence, may he  
24 add wisdom to intelligence to make his work a center

25 of justice and an agency for peace at home and abroad  
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1       for the family of all mankind.

2               MR. USCHOLD: Admiral Turner, that's excellent,  
3       and I want to thank you for being with us on Directions.

4               ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you. I enjoyed this  
5       very much.

6               (Whereupon, the program was ended.)

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
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*AFRTS*

8 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Herbert E. Hetu  
Assistant to the Director  
(Public Affairs)

SUBJECT: AFRTS Interview

1. At 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, 9 June, you will be interviewed on film and audio tape by the American Forces Radio and Television correspondent, John Uschold. What results will be a 1/2 hour program designed for release through the AFRTS worldwide network. It will go to 270 American Forces television stations, 740 American Forces radio stations and a transcript (or selected quotes in the form of a release) to 1,800 units/installation newspapers, European and Pacific editions of the Stars and Stripes and to Department of Defense and American Forces periodicals.

2. John Uschold is a very professional interviewer who has been doing this show for AFRTS for several years (he interviewed Secretary's Chafee and Warner). While AFRTS is not in the business of making national news, they do hope for a lively interview to hold the attention of their somewhat captive audience.

3. Attached are several questions and areas of discussion which Uschold has relayed to us.



Herbert E. Hetu

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Attachment

**Administrative - Internal Use Only**

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1. A response to the charge in the Evans-Novak column that there is a deal between the President and the DCI involving the position of CNO and JCS and whether the DCI job is a "stepping stone." (Uschold said they would welcome strong answer to this one.)
2. The timing of the energy report; was it politically motivated?
3. The relationship between the DoD and CIA; how do they interface?
4. Is CIA continuing its covert operations in light of all the political and media criticism?
5. About the CIA budget; should it be opened up, kept secret, or go with the one overall figure?
6. Jack Anderson describes the CIA's mission as "the nation's first line of defense." Do you agree? How do you see the CIA's role in the future; changing?
7. Describe your plans for goals and objectives, for both yourself and the Agency and the Community.
8. What do you do with your leisure time; how do you unwind; how long is your work day?

7 June/1510

Herb,

Talked to John Uschold, who'll be doing Thursday's 1000 interview with the DCI for American Radio and Television Netwrks. He said this was to be the introduction of Admiral Turner to all of the Department of Defense and would be given heavy distribution throughout the services.

Uschold said his questions during the 30-minute (air time) interview would probably be built around the following general questions:

1. The Admiral's response to the charge in the Evans-Novak column that there is a deal between the President and the DCI involving the position of CNO and JCS and whether the DCI job is a "stepping stone." (Uschold said this should be addressed strongly by the DCI)
2. The timing of the energy report; was it politically motivated?
3. The relationship between the DOD and CIA; how do they interface?
4. Is CIA continuing its covert operations in light of all the political and media criticism?
5. About the CIA budget: should it be opened up, kept secret, or go with the one oberall figure?
6. Jack Anderson describes the CIA's mission as "the nation's first line of defense." Do you agree? How do you see the CIA's role in the future; changing?
7. Describe your plans for goals and objectives for both yourself and the Agency and the Community.
8. What do you do with your leisure time; how do you unwind; how long is your work day?

Jim

Wants to touch on point in the Evans & Novak Column that dealt with the stepping stone into something bigger.

CIA Energy report and its timing.

Relationship to the Defense Department; how do the two interface.

About Covert operations; are you going to continue covert operations despite the criticism in the past?

About the CIA budget; should it be brought out in the open or kept buried.

CIA and its mission termed as it touches first line of defense. Would you agree; how do you see it?

What do you do with your leisure time.

Personal and CIA Goals and objectives; what do you see in the future for the CIA and the Intelligence Community.

How do you unwind; how many hours you put in?

John Uschak 7 June/1510

Evans/Novak cd:

- ① Touch on Carter-Turner deal - CNO/JCS  
Sensitive - he should address
- ② CIA's energy report - Timing
- ③ Relationship - CIA/DOD  
how 2 interface
- ④ Covert operations - are they continuing
- ⑤ Budget - totally out in open  
Admiral's views
- ⑥ CIA's mission described as  
"nation's first line of defense"  
- Jack Anderson - do you agree - how do you see it

⑦ ~~Reference~~ *Timeline*  
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⑧ personal + Agency/IC  
goals + objectives

⑨ Comm off / Tied to Pentagon

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into of ST to DoD

Audience

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6 May 1977

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

John Uschold and George Gallivan from American Forces Radio and TV discussed arrangements for a filmed interview with the DCI with Mr Hetu and [redacted] No firm date for the interview was made, but the month of June was discussed and it was agreed that it would take place in the DCI's office on a Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday morning. Mondays and Fridays are out because of the DCI's schedule.

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[redacted] DCI Security has agreed the AFRT equipment can be brought up to the seventh floor in the DCI elevator and arrangements can be made to allow the AFRT vehicle to come in the basement to the DCI elevator area. Uschold and Gallivan were escorted around the first floor by [redacted] and then shown the DCI office and the conference room. They preferred the former, indicating a preference for shooting their 16mm film cameras at the DCI and his interviewer against the window backdrop. They asked if the Admiral would like any personal items (family pictures, models of ships, etc) in the picture. The entire setup should take no more than three hours. For example: arrive CIA at 0900; shoot half-hour interview between 1000-1100; out of compound by 1200. Approximate amount of time with DCI 45 to 60 minutes. The five-man crew will work with two cameras on tripods and will need 60 amps of power for cameras and lights. Good indicated no problem, there's an electrical closet in hallway just outside DCI offices. All five men in the crew are TOP SECRET cleared from DOD.

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18 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Herbert E. Hetu  
Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs)

SUBJECT : Interview requests from Armed Forces Radio  
and Television Networks

1. Attached is a one page detailed request from AFRTS for an interview.

2. This is a relatively painless interview from your point of view. They will pre-submit questions - do the interview under any circumstances we dictate - and make a healthy distribution. In addition we will end up with copies of the show for our own use. The credibility from the press/public point of view is low - but they aren't the primary audience for this interview and it is another means to get out the message.

3. I recommend we do the interview.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Herbert E. Hetu

✓

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Approve ✓ 20 APR 1977

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

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